Defence — France · Synthesis

A sharply accelerating budget effort. The Military Programming Law (LPM) 2024-2030 set an envelope of €413.3 billion, bringing the defence effort to 2% of GDP from 2025. The 2026 draft budget law appropriates €66.7 billion for the Defence mission (around 2.3% of GDP), already above the LPM's initial trajectory. In April 2026, a major revision added €36 billion, raising the period envelope to €449 billion — a revision driven by the deteriorating security environment (Ukraine, Middle East). At this pace, the armed forces budget should reach around €69–70 billion in 2030 and become the State's largest budget, ahead of Education.

Human resources: the recruitment battle, won in the short term, fragile in the long term. The Ministry of the Armed Forces employs 269,000 people (military and civilian) and aims for 275,000 by 2030. As the leading public-sector recruiter, it renews more than 10% of its workforce each year (nearly 27,000 people). After three years of under-delivery, recruitment recovered in 2024 with 26,518 enlistments. But parliamentary reports (information mission of the Defence Committee, March 2025) identify retention as the weak point: enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers leave the institution too quickly for the private sector, in a context of intense competition for skilled profiles (cyber, intelligence, drones, maintenance).

Modernized capabilities but critical gaps for high-intensity conflict. France retains a full-spectrum army model and a two-component nuclear deterrent — a European singularity. But the Army's deputy chief of staff (General Justel, 2026) describes a paradox: an abundant human pool facing a shortage of equipment for high-intensity combat. The gaps identified: electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, ground-to-air defence, long-range fires, and above all stock depth (ammunition, spare parts). Modernization continues (Scorpion programme, Rafale at F4 standard, deterrent renewal), but the force structure remains calibrated for power projection rather than a protracted war of attrition.

A world-leading industrial base, export-driven. France is the world's 2nd largest arms exporter over 2021-2025 (9.8% of the market, up 21%), having delivered major weapons to 63 states. Export orders reached €18 billion in 2024 and around €20 billion in 2025, driven by the Rafale, Caesar artillery systems and submarines. The shift to a 'war economy' declared in 2022 has ramped up production rates (ammunition, artillery, armoured vehicles, missiles). The downside: structural dependence on exports, with nearly 80% of sales outside Europe (India, Egypt, Greece).

A posture under reconfiguration. France has significantly reduced its African footprint (end of the Sahel operations, closure or transfer of bases in Chad, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in 2024-2025) and redeployed its effort towards NATO's Eastern flank (Operation Eagle in Romania, Lynx in Estonia), UNIFIL in Lebanon (Daman) and the anti-Daesh coalition (Chammal), while retaining its support points in Djibouti and the UAE and its overseas sovereignty forces.

A budget trajectory that has not finished rising. Beyond the 2026 revision (€449 billion), the commitment made at the NATO Summit in The Hague (June 2025) to bring defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% 'core' + 1.5% 'adjacent') would ultimately imply a budget of around €160 billion for France. That is a near-tripling compared with today — and the main uncertainty in the outlook.

Financing, the central tension. Control bodies (High Council of Public Finance, Cour des comptes) and think tanks (IFRAP) warn of sustainability: defence is becoming an 'inflexible' and programmed expenditure in a State budget constrained by debt. The 2% → 3% → 5% of GDP debate squarely poses the question: funded by what revenues, and at the expense of what?

European rearmament: opportunity and competition. Europe has become the world's largest arms importer (imports up 210% between 2016-20 and 2021-25). French exports to European countries have jumped by 452%. France positions itself as an industrial pillar of the European effort — but Germany (now the 4th largest exporter, ahead of China) and Italy (6th, +157%) are advancing fast. The battle of the coming years will be fought as much over European market shares as over the continent's strategic autonomy.

Maturing the 'war economy'. Priority workstreams: closing the gap on drones (first orders for loitering munitions drawing on lessons from Ukraine), replenishing ammunition stocks (€16 billion planned in the LPM), accelerating production (reform of the DGA towards a 'combat DGA') and investing in breakthrough innovation (€10 billion: drones, AI, quantum, robotics, space, cyber).

The open questions. Three trade-offs will structure the decade: (1) financial sustainability in the face of debt; (2) retaining rare skills; (3) balance between an expeditionary/projection army, territorial defence and depth for high-intensity conflict — a doctrinal debate that the war in Ukraine has reopened.

Placed in its environment, French performance reads differently: France is no longer Europe's largest military budget, but retains a capability singularity that exceeds its budget ranking.

Three takeaways: (1) The European hierarchy has shifted. Driven by a 24% increase ($114 bn, 2.3% of GDP), Germany now clearly surpasses France and the United Kingdom in volume and becomes Europe's largest military budget — a reversal compared with the previous decade. France is no longer the continent's leading defence spender.

(2) A relative effort around the average. At ~2% of GDP, France is at the NATO threshold, but below the Alliance average (~2.76% in 2025) and far below the United States (~3.4%), Russia (7.5%) or the Eastern European countries.

(3) A singularity that offsets the volume gap. France remains the world's 2nd largest exporter (ahead of Germany and Italy), one of only two nuclear powers in Europe and the only one in the Union, with a full-spectrum military and a global posture. Its strategic weight therefore exceeds its budget ranking — but if the volume gap with Germany is confirmed, European military leadership could be at stake.