Citoyen
  • Home
  • Feed

Explore

  • Countries
  • Categories
  • Compare
  • My follows

Understand

  • BriefingsBy country and category
  • Deep divesIn-depth analyses
  • Track recordsEach leader's record
  • ReformsTracker and simulators

Data

  • Sources
  • Calendar
  • Method

Citoyen

  • About
  1. World
  2. ›
  3. Education & training

School: what do the systems at the top of PISA do?

East Asia and Estonia have the highest scores in the PISA survey, with few pupils far behind. France has been slipping for twenty years. What these systems have in common, what has really been evaluated, and what does not set them apart.

Citoyen·Data as of Nov 15, 2026
Scope: Primary, lower and upper secondary: the 15-year-olds tested by PISA 2025 (OECD), higher education left out; spending per pupil from primary to upper secondary (Education at a Glance, OECD), latest year published for each country.▾

This deep dive is updated at least once a quarter with the new figures. Follow it to get a notification at each update.

Key points

Maths score of Estonia, first country in Europe508 pointsPISA 2025, against 458 points in France and 463 points on average in the OECD
15-year-olds far behind in maths, France35.7%below Level 2 in 2025, against 17.2% in Estonia and 16.1% in Japan
Score gap linked to social background, France95 pointsbetween the most and the least advantaged quarter of pupils; 76 points in Estonia
Less spending for a score at least as high as France’s71%spending per pupil from primary to upper secondary, countries observed in the OECD (2022)
  • The leading systems above all have few pupils far behind. Singapore (563 points), Japan (525 points), South Korea (522 points) and Estonia (508 points) are well above the OECD average (463 points). Their lead comes from the bottom as much as the top: 16.1% of pupils far behind in Japan and 17.2% in Estonia, against 35.7% in France.
  • Keeping all pupils together longer lifts the weakest (evidence level B). Estonia, Japan and Korea do not split pupils before 15 or 16. In Poland, one more year of common schooling in 1999 was followed by a sharp rise in reading (479 points in 2000, 518 points in 2012), and studies attribute part of that gain to the reform.
  • The best-demonstrated measures concern the classroom, not structures (level A). Small-group tutoring during the school day has large effects in dozens of controlled experiments; Singapore’s maths method, tested in England, gives a real but modest gain. Teacher quality matters a great deal (level B).
  • Beyond a certain level, it is not about money. A pupil costs $15,798 a year in the United States and $13,722 in France, against $10,827 in Estonia. A score at least as high as France’s is observed elsewhere for 71% less spending. A correlation, not proof: within a country, money well spent improves results.
How to read these figures

PISA tests 15-year-olds every three years in maths, reading and science, whatever their grade. Scores are on a common scale; trends are read on the average of the OECD countries comparable in every round, which differs slightly from the average of all members. China is represented only by four rich provinces (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang), not by the whole country. A pupil “far behind” is below Level 2, the minimum the OECD considers needed to use maths in everyday life.

Each measure comes with a level of evidence: A for controlled experiments (random assignment), B for quasi-experimental studies (a reform compared with a control group), C for comparisons of data, D for a plausible, untested hypothesis. Charts across countries are correlations: culture, private lessons outside school, wealth and immigration matter too. They raise questions; they do not point to a model to copy.

1. Who leads, and who is slipping

In 2025 the highest maths scores are those of four Chinese provinces (612 points), Singapore (563 points), Macao (549 points), Chinese Taipei (546 points), Japan and South Korea. Estonia (508 points) is the first European country, 50 points ahead of France.

The average of the comparable OECD countries has lost 33 points since 2003 – 2025. France has lost 53 since 2003. Finland, long held up as a model, has fallen 80 points from its peak in 2006 and is now below Poland: a ranking is never secured.

Mean maths score in PISA, 15-year-olds

The OECD average is that of the countries with comparable data in every round. 2022 follows the school closures of the pandemic.

  • OECD average (comparable countries)
  • France
  • Finland
  • Poland
  • Estonia
  • South Korea
  • Japan

Source:OECD

Show the chart data
PeriodJapanSouth KoreaEstoniaPolandFinlandFranceOECD average (comparable countries)
2003534 points542 points–490 points544 points511 points502 points
2006523 points548 points515 points495 points548 points496 points501 points
2009529 points546 points512 points495 points541 points497 points502 points
2012536 points554 points521 points518 points519 points495 points499 points
2015532 points524 points520 points505 points511 points493 points496 points
2018527 points526 points523 points516 points507 points495 points496 points
2022536 points527 points510 points489 points484 points474 points480 points
2025525 points522 points508 points484 points469 points458 points469 points

2. A high level and few pupils left behind

The leading systems do not owe their rank to an elite: they have very few pupils below Level 2 (3.6% in the Chinese provinces, 11.2% in Singapore, 16.1% in Japan, 17.2% in Estonia, against 35.7% in France and 34.9% in the OECD). They also have more top performers (37.4% in Singapore, 22.3% in Japan, 5.2% in France).

The gap linked to social background varies widely. It is 76 points in Estonia, 79 in Japan, 55 in Macao, against 95 in France and 112 in Germany. The chart below places the 86 participants: a high level and a moderate social gap can go together (Macao, Estonia, Japan), though not as a rule, since Singapore’s gap is 103 points.

Gap linked to social background and maths score, PISA 2025 participants

Horizontally: difference in maths score between the most and the least advantaged quarter of pupils (OECD index of economic, social and cultural status). Vertically: mean score. Regions tested alone are not shown, except the four Chinese provinces.

  • Countries discussed
  • Other countries
Tap or hover over a dot to see which country it is.
300400500600050100150Social gap (points)Maths scoreBeijing-Shanghai-Jiangsu-Zhejiang (China)Chinese TaipeiEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyJapanSouth KoreaMacao (China)PolandSingapore

Source:OECD

Show the chart data
CountrySocial gap (points)Maths scorePeriod
Kenya3 points326 points2025
Cambodia20 points366 points2025
Rwanda21 points312 points2025
Jordan31 points388 points2025
Kosovo39 points350 points2025
Saudi Arabia41 points390 points2025
Kyrgyzstan41 points364 points2025
Indonesia43 points364 points2025
Armenia43 points376 points2025
Kazakhstan44 points414 points2025
Thailand46 points407 points2025
Palestinian Territories46 points354 points2025
Georgia50 points416 points2025
Philippines51 points371 points2025
United Arab Emirates51 points453 points2025
Dominican Republic53 points339 points2025
Lebanon54 points377 points2025
Macao (China)55 points549 points2025
Guatemala55 points334 points2025
Morocco55 points355 points2025
Albania57 points433 points2025
Mexico57 points388 points2025
Qatar58 points416 points2025
Denmark58 points471 points2025
Latvia58 points461 points2025
Iceland58 points450 points2025
El Salvador59 points346 points2025
Paraguay61 points334 points2025
Montenegro62 points411 points2025
Canada63 points485 points2025
North Macedonia64 points380 points2025
Lithuania67 points471 points2025
Slovenia67 points460 points2025
Hong Kong SAR China67 points522 points2025
Ecuador68 points366 points2025
Malta68 points439 points2025
Chile70 points403 points2025
Cyprus70 points412 points2025
Finland71 points469 points2025
Ireland73 points480 points2025
Spain73 points457 points2025
Azerbaijan73 points422 points2025
Peru75 points382 points2025
Brunei76 points435 points2025
Estonia76 points508 points2025
Greece77 points424 points2025
Colombia78 points381 points2025
Mauritius78 points407 points2025
Norway78 points452 points2025
Moldova78 points410 points2025
Serbia79 points417 points2025
Japan79 points525 points2025
Italy79 points468 points2025
Argentina79 points367 points2025
Mongolia80 points419 points2025
Sweden80 points464 points2025
Austria81 points477 points2025
Poland82 points484 points2025
Australia82 points478 points2025
Israel83 points433 points2025
Malaysia83 points397 points2025
Beijing-Shanghai-Jiangsu-Zhejiang (China)84 points612 points2025
New Zealand86 points480 points2025
United Kingdom87 points488 points2025
Croatia88 points455 points2025
Brazil90 points377 points2025
South Korea90 points522 points2025
Bulgaria91 points405 points2025
Vietnam93 points443 points2025
United States93 points463 points2025
Uruguay93 points405 points2025
Chinese Taipei94 points546 points2025
France95 points458 points2025
Türkiye96 points462 points2025
Belgium97 points480 points2025
Switzerland98 points499 points2025
Portugal100 points460 points2025
Czechia100 points477 points2025
Netherlands102 points483 points2025
Singapore103 points563 points2025
Hungary104 points460 points2025
Luxembourg108 points458 points2025
Germany112 points464 points2025
Slovakia116 points469 points2025
Romania135 points419 points2025
Zambia143 points314 points2025

3. Keeping all pupils together longer

Estonia schools every pupil in a single basic school for nine years; Japan and South Korea do not split them before upper secondary. Germany, by contrast, sends most children into different tracks at around 10, and its social gap is among the widest in the previous chart.

Poland is the best-studied case. In 1999 it created a single lower secondary school that delayed vocational tracking by one year. Its reading results rose from 479 points in 2000 to 518 points in 2012, above the OECD average (500 points in 2000). In 2017 the country went back to tracking at 15; its reading score is 482 points in 2025, a fall the pandemic makes impossible to attribute to the reform alone.

Common schooling is not a universal rule of the leading systems: Singapore long split its pupils into tracks from lower secondary and has only been replacing them since 2024 with subject-by-subject levels.

Mean reading score in PISA, Poland and comparisons

Poland’s 1999 reform affected pupils tested from 2003 on; the 2017 reform, pupils tested from 2022 on.

  • OECD average (comparable countries)
  • Germany
  • France
  • Finland
  • Poland

Source:OECD

Show the chart data
PeriodPolandFinlandFranceGermanyOECD average (comparable countries)
2000479 points547 points505 points484 points500 points
2003497 points544 points496 points491 points497 points
2006508 points547 points488 points495 points496 points
2009501 points536 points496 points497 points499 points
2012518 points524 points506 points508 points501 points
2015506 points526 points499 points509 points497 points
2018512 points520 points493 points498 points493 points
2022489 points490 points474 points480 points482 points
2025482 points474 points456 points465 points466 points

Sorting pupils later: what the research says

B
Level of evidence B

Two kinds of studies agree: delaying the split of pupils into tracks narrows the gaps between them, and Poland’s 1999 reform, the best studied, also raised the average. These are quasi-experimental studies, not controlled experiments: the result is solid, its size depends on the country.

  • B
    Jakubowski, Patrinos, Porta and Wiśniewski (2016), Education EconomicsMethod: Poland’s 1999 reform (one more year of common schooling), pupils before and after compared by matching and difference-in-differences

    Delaying vocational tracking and spending more time on basic skills had a positive, significant effect on pupils’ results, above all for those who would have gone into vocational tracks.

  • B
    Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), Economic JournalMethod: international comparison of how gaps change between primary and secondary school, by age of first tracking

    Early tracking increases inequality of results; its effect on the average is less clear, if anything negative.

The scale
  • A: causal effect shown by several studies with a rigorous design (experiment, reform compared with a control group), in several countries.
  • B: causal effect shown by at least one rigorous study, or several quasi-experimental studies that agree.
  • C: strong correlations and a plausible mechanism, no causal proof.
  • D: descriptive observation or expert opinion only.

4. Trained teachers and a coherent curriculum

The leading Asian systems take care over entry into the profession and teachers’ teamwork. Singapore trains all its teachers in a single national institute; in Japan and Shanghai, teachers prepare and observe lessons together, then improve them (“lesson study”). Their maths curricula move slowly, on few concepts at a time, until the whole class has mastered them.

These choices are consistent with what research finds on the effect of teachers. But only the maths method has been tested outside Asia, with a modest gain: copying one practice without the rest of the system delivers a small part of it.

Teachers and methods: what the research says

B
Level of evidence B

That teacher quality matters a great deal is established by large quasi-experimental studies. Whether a method from Asia works elsewhere has been tested in controlled experiments: the effect is positive but modest. The selective recruitment practised in Asia has never been evaluated experimentally.

  • B
    Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014), American Economic ReviewMethod: one million US pupils followed into adulthood, each teacher’s effect measured by the progress of their classes

    Pupils who had a teacher whose classes progress a lot go to college more often and earn more as adults.

  • A
    Jerrim and Vignoles (2016), Economics of Education ReviewMethod: two controlled experiments in English primary and secondary schools with the Singapore-inspired “mastery” maths method

    The method slightly improves maths results at low cost: a real but modest gain.

The scale
  • A: causal effect shown by several studies with a rigorous design (experiment, reform compared with a control group), in several countries.
  • B: causal effect shown by at least one rigorous study, or several quasi-experimental studies that agree.
  • C: strong correlations and a plausible mechanism, no causal proof.
  • D: descriptive observation or expert opinion only.

5. Catching struggling pupils early

The clearest common feature of the leading systems is the small number of pupils far behind. The best-demonstrated intervention to get there is tutoring: a few pupils with a trained adult, regularly, during school hours.

Part of the Asian lead is, however, won outside school: in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and China, many families pay for private evening lessons. Scores measure what pupils know, not only what school taught them, and this pressure has a cost for their well-being.

Helping struggling pupils early: what the research says

A
Level of evidence A

This is one of the best-demonstrated school interventions: dozens of controlled experiments, pooled in a meta-analysis, find large effects. They come mostly from the United States and the United Kingdom, not from Asian countries.

  • A
    Nickow, Oreopoulos and Quan (2020), NBERMethod: meta-analysis of nearly a hundred controlled experiments of tutoring, from pre-school to upper secondary

    Tutoring has large effects on learning, larger when it is given by teachers or trained assistants, during the school day, and early for reading.

The scale
  • A: causal effect shown by several studies with a rigorous design (experiment, reform compared with a control group), in several countries.
  • B: causal effect shown by at least one rigorous study, or several quasi-experimental studies that agree.
  • C: strong correlations and a plausible mechanism, no causal proof.
  • D: descriptive observation or expert opinion only.

6. What does not set the leading systems apart: money

A pupil from primary to upper secondary costs $15,798 a year in the United States, $13,722 in France, $11,863 in Japan, $22,486 in South Korea, $10,827 in Estonia and $10,423 in Poland. Of the 37 countries observed, 7 form the efficiency frontier, and a score at least as high as France’s is reached elsewhere for 71% less spending (38% for the United States).

Class size does not set them apart either: Japan’s lower secondary classes are among the largest in the OECD. That does not mean money and small classes are useless: the best studies show they help, above all the youngest and the poorest. They simply do not explain the gaps between countries.

Spending per pupil and maths score, OECD and partner countries

Annual spending of institutions per pupil, primary to upper secondary (Education at a Glance, OECD), purchasing-power-parity dollars, latest year published (2020 – 2023). PISA 2025 score. The dotted line is the efficiency frontier.

  • Efficiency frontier
  • Countries discussed
  • Other countries
Tap or hover over a dot to see which country it is.
40045050010,00020,00030,000Spending per pupil (PPP $)Maths scorePolandSouth KoreaJapanUnited StatesGermanyFinlandEstoniaFrance

Source:OECD

Show the chart data
CountrySpending per pupil (PPP $)Maths scorePeriodOn the frontier
Mexico$3,406388 points2022yes
Türkiye$4,032462 points2022yes
Romania$6,288419 points2022
Chile$6,602403 points2022
Bulgaria$7,624405 points2022
Hungary$7,900460 points2022
Greece$8,119424 points2022
Latvia$8,355461 points2022
Slovakia$9,784469 points2022yes
Lithuania$10,030471 points2022yes
Poland$10,423484 points2022yes
Estonia$10,827508 points2022yes
New Zealand$11,760480 points2023
Czechia$11,847477 points2022
Japan$11,863525 points2022yes
Spain$12,231457 points2022
Israel$12,372433 points2022
Portugal$12,586460 points2022
Canada$12,765485 points2020
Slovenia$13,005460 points2022
Italy$13,459468 points2022
Finland$13,508469 points2022
France$13,722458 points2022
Ireland$14,059480 points2022
United Kingdom$15,416488 points2022
Sweden$15,484464 points2022
Australia$15,611478 points2022
United States$15,798463 points2021
Germany$16,433464 points2022
Denmark$16,783471 points2023
Belgium$17,224480 points2022
Netherlands$17,287483 points2022
Iceland$18,287450 points2022
Austria$18,626477 points2022
Norway$20,407452 points2022
South Korea$22,486522 points2022
Luxembourg$29,238458 points2022
  • 71%Less spending for a score at least as high as France’scheapest country among those doing at least as well ($4,032 per pupil)

    Source:OECD

  • 38%Same calculation for the United Statesa score at least as high is observed elsewhere for a fraction of US spending

    Source:OECD

Money and class size: what the research says

A
Level of evidence A

Comparisons between countries show no clear link between spending and results beyond a certain level. But within a country, experiments and well-studied reforms show that money well spent, and smaller classes for the youngest, improve results. It is not what sets the leading systems apart; that does not make it useless.

  • A
    Krueger (1999), Quarterly Journal of Economics (Project STAR, Tennessee)Method: controlled experiment: about 11,600 pupils from kindergarten to third grade randomly assigned to small or regular classes

    Pupils in small classes progress more in the first year and then a little each year, above all disadvantaged pupils.

  • B
    Jackson, Johnson and Persico (2016), Quarterly Journal of EconomicsMethod: school finance reforms in US states, cohorts exposed or not compared

    A lasting rise in spending per pupil lengthens schooling and raises adult wages, above all for children from low-income families.

The scale
  • A: causal effect shown by several studies with a rigorous design (experiment, reform compared with a control group), in several countries.
  • B: causal effect shown by at least one rigorous study, or several quasi-experimental studies that agree.
  • C: strong correlations and a plausible mechanism, no causal proof.
  • D: descriptive observation or expert opinion only.

What we know, what we don’t

What the figures establish

  • The systems at the top of PISA have very few pupils far behind; several of them also have a moderate social gap.
  • Delaying tracking reduces inequality; in Poland, the 1999 reform also raised the average.
  • Small-group tutoring during the school day and teacher quality have demonstrated effects.

What they don’t tell

  • How much of the Asian lead comes from school rather than private lessons, culture or pupils’ working hours.
  • Whether the practices of the leading systems would give the same results transplanted wholesale into another country.
  • What explains the recent decline of Finland, France and the OECD average, beyond the school closures of the pandemic.

Stay up to date

This deep dive is updated at least once a quarter with the new figures. Follow it to get a notification at each update.

Sources

Series downloaded from their producers on Nov 15, 2026, the snapshot date. Only published periods are used: no projection.

  • OECD PISA 2025 Results (Volume I), Annex B1: mean performance, proficiency levels and trends
  • OECD PISA 2025 Results (Volume I), Annex B1: performance gap by socio-economic status
  • OECD Education at a Glance, expenditure per student on educational institutions, DSD_EAG_UOE_FIN@DF_UOE_INDIC_FIN_PERSTUD